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Updated Interim Guidance for Laboratory Testing of Persons with 
Suspected Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus in the United 
States
This update provides revised interim guidance for testing of suspected human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) 
in the United States and is based on the current state of knowledge regarding human infection with H5N1 viruses. 
The epidemiology of H5N1 human infections has not changed significantly since February 2004. Therefore, CDC 
recommends that H5N1 surveillance in the United States remain at the enhanced level first established at that 
time. However, this revised interim guidance provides an updated case definition of a suspected H5N1 human 
case for the purpose of determining when testing should be undertaken and also provides more detailed 
information on laboratory testing. Effective surveillance will continue to rely on health care providers obtaining 
information regarding international travel and other exposure risks from persons with specified respiratory 
symptoms as detailed in the recommendations below. This guidance will be updated as the epidemiology of H5N1 
changes. Note: CDC is revising its interim guidance for infection control precautions for avian influenza A (H5N1). 
These will be issued as soon as they are available.
Current Situation
The avian influenza A (H5N1) epizootic (animal outbreak) in Asia has expanded to wild birds and/or poultry in 
parts of Europe, the Near East and Africa. Sporadic human infections with H5N1 continue to be reported and 
have most recently occurred in China, Egypt, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, and Djibouti. In addition, rare 
instances of probable human-to-human transmission associated with H5N1 viruses have occurred, most recently 
in a family cluster in Indonesia. So far, however, the spread of H5N1 virus from person to person has been rare, 
inefficient, and unsustained. The total number of confirmed human cases of H5N1 reported as of June 7, 2006 
has reached 225. The case fatality rate for these reported cases continues to be approximately 50 percent. As of 
this date, H5N1 has not been identified among animals or humans in the United States.
The epizootic in Asia and parts of Europe, the Near East and Africa is not expected to diminish significantly in the 
short term and it is likely that H5N1 infection among birds has become enzootic in certain areas. It is expected 
that human infections resulting from direct contact with infected poultry will continue to occur in affected countries. 
Since no sustained human-to-human transmission of influenza H5N1 has been documented anywhere in the 
world, the current phase of alert, based on the World Health Organization (WHO) global influenza preparedness 
plan, remains at Phase 3 (Pandemic Alert).* In addition, no evidence for genetic reassortment between human 
and avian influenza A virus genes has been found. Nevertheless, this expanding epizootic continues to pose an 
important and growing public health threat. CDC is in communication with WHO and other national and 
international agencies and continues to monitor the situation closely.
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Reporting and Testing Guidelines
CDC recommends maintaining the enhanced surveillance efforts practiced currently by state and local health 
departments, hospitals, and clinicians to identify patients at increased risk for avian influenza A (H5N1). Guidance 
for enhanced surveillance was first described in a HAN update issued on February 3, 2004 and most recently 
updated on February 4, 2005.
Testing for avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection is recommended for:
A patient who has an illness that:
■ requires hospitalization or is fatal; AND
■ has or had a documented temperature of >38°C (>100.4° F); AND
■ has radiographically confirmed pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), or other severe 
respiratory illness for which an alternate diagnosis has not been established; AND
■ has at least one of the following potential exposures within 10 days of symptom onset:
A) History of travel to a country with influenza H5N1 documented in poultry, wild birds, and/or humans, AND had 
at least one of the following potential exposures during travel:
■ direct contact with (e.g., touching) sick or dead domestic poultry;
■ direct contact with surfaces contaminated with poultry feces;
■ consumption of raw or incompletely cooked poultry or poultry products;
■ direct contact with sick or dead wild birds suspected or confirmed to have influenza H5N1;
■ close contact (approach within 1 meter [approx. 3 feet]) of a person who was hospitalized or died due to a
severe unexplained respiratory illness;
B) Close contact (approach within 1 meter [approx. 3 feet]) of an ill patient who was confirmed or suspected to 
have H5N1;
C) Worked with live influenza H5N1 virus in a laboratory.
Testing for avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection can be considered on a case-by-case basis, in consultation 
with local and state health departments, for:
■ A patient with mild or atypical disease (hospitalized or ambulatory) who has one of the exposures listed above 
(criteria A, B, or C); OR
■ A patient with severe or fatal respiratory disease whose epidemiological information is uncertain, unavailable, or 
otherwise suspicious but does not meet the criteria above (examples include: a returned traveler from an
influenza H5N1-affected country whose exposures are unclear or suspicious, a person who had contact with sick 
or well-appearing poultry, etc.)
Clinicians should contact their local or state health department as soon as possible to report any suspected 
human case of influenza H5N1 in the United States.
Specimen Collection and Testing Guidelines
■ Oropharyngeal swab specimens and lower respiratory tract specimens (e.g., bronchoalveolar lavage or tracheal 
aspirates) are preferred because they appear to contain the highest quantity of virus for influenza H5N1 detection, 
as determined on the basis of available data. Nasal or nasopharyngeal swab specimens are acceptable, but may 
contain less virus and therefore not be optimal specimens for virus detection.
■ Detection of influenza H5N1 is more likely from specimens collected within the first 3 days of illness onset. If 
possible, serial specimens should be obtained over several days from the same patient.
■ Bronchoalveolar lavage is considered to be a high-risk aerosol-generating procedure. Therefore, infection 
control precautions should include the use of gloves, gown, goggles or face shield, and a fit-tested respirator with 
an N-95 or higher rated filter. A loose-fitting powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) may be used if fit-testing is 
not possible (for example, if the person has a beard). Detailed guidance on infection control precautions for health 
care workers caring for suspected influenza H5N1 patients is available.
■ Swabs used for specimen collection should have a Dacron tip and an aluminum or plastic shaft. Swabs with 
calcium alginate or cotton tips and wooden shafts are not recommended.
■ Specimens should be placed at 4°C immediately after collection.
■ For reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) analysis, nucleic acid extraction lysis buffer can 
be added to specimens (for virus inactivation and RNA stabilization), after which specimens can be stored and 
shipped at 4°C. Otherwise, specimens should be frozen at or below -70°C and shipped on dry ice. For viral 
isolation, specimens can be stored and shipped at 4°C. If specimens are not expected to be inoculated into 
culture within 2 days, they should be frozen at or below -70°C and shipped on dry ice. Avoid repeated freeze/thaw 
cycles.
■ Influenza H5N1-specific RT-PCR testing conducted under Biosafety Level 2 conditions is the preferred method 
for diagnosis. All state public health laboratories, several local public health laboratories, and CDC are able to 
perform influenza H5N1 RT-PCR testing, and are the recommended sites for initial diagnosis.
■ Viral culture should NOT be attempted on specimens from patients suspected to have influenza H5N1, unless 
conducted under Biosafety Level 3 conditions with enhancements.
■ Commercial rapid influenza antigen testing in the evaluation of suspected influenza H5N1 cases should be 
interpreted with caution. Clinicians should be aware that these tests have relatively low sensitivities, and a 
negative result would not exclude a diagnosis of influenza H5N1. In addition, a positive result does not distinguish 
between seasonal and avian influenza A viruses.
■ Serologic testing for influenza H5N1-specific antibody, using appropriately timed specimens, can be considered 
if other influenza H5N1 diagnostic testing methods are unsuccessful (for example, due to delays in respiratory 
specimen collection). Paired serum specimens from the same patient are required for influenza H5N1 diagnosis: 
one sample should be tested within the first week of illness, and a second sample should be tested 2-4 weeks 
later. A demonstrated rise in the H5N1-specific antibody level is required for a diagnosis of H5N1 infection. 
Currently, the microneutralization assay, which requires live virus, is the recommended test for measuring H5N1- 
specific antibody. Any work with live wild-type highly pathogenic influenza H5N1 viruses must be conducted in a 
USDA-approved Biosafety Level 3 enhanced containment facility. Visit http://www.cdc.gov/flu/h2n2bsl3.htm for 
more information about procedures and facilities recommended for manipulating highly pathogenic avian 
influenza viruses.
Laboratory testing results positive for influenza A (H5N1) in the United States should be confirmed at CDC, which 
has been designated as a WHO H5 Reference Laboratory. Before sending specimens, state and local health 
departments should contact CDC's on-call epidemiologist at (404) 639-3747 or (404) 639-3591 (Monday - Friday, 
8:30 AM - 5:00 PM) or (770) 488-7100 (all other times).
Travel Health Notice
CDC has not recommended that the general public avoid travel to any of the countries affected by H5N1.
However, CDC does recommend that travelers to these countries avoid poultry farms and bird markets or other 
places where live poultry are raised or kept. For details about other ways to reduce the risk of infection, see 
http://www.cdc.gov/travel/other/avian_influenza_se_asia_2005.htm.
More Information
■ Department of Health and Human Services at www.pandemicflu.gov
■ World Health Organization at World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) at http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm
■ For the current WHO Pandemic Phase, see 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html.
■ For a listing of influenza H5N1-affected countries, visit the CDC website at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/current.htm; the OIE website at http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm; and 
the WHO website at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/.
■ For example, a patient with respiratory illness and fever who does not require hospitalization, or a patient with 
significant neurologic or gastrointestinal symptoms in the absence of respiratory disease.
■ Interim recommendations for infection control in health-care facilities caring for patients with known or suspected 
avian influenza are available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/professional/infect-control.htm.
■ Specimens can be transported in viral transport media, Hanks balanced salt solution, cell culture medium, 
tryptose-phosphate broth, veal infusion broth, or sucrose-phosphate buffer. Transport media should be 
supplemented with protein, such as bovine serum albumin or gelatin, to a concentration of 0.5% to 1%.
■ Information regarding Laboratory Biosafety Level Criteria can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4s3.htm.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) protects people's health and safety by 
preventing and controlling diseases and injuries; enhances health decisions by providing credible 
information on critical health issues; and promotes healthy living through strong partnerships with
local, national and international organizations.
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